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Abstract 
In July 2011, the European Commission published a Communication aimed at setting out dif-
ferent options for establishing a European terrorist finance tracking system (TFTS). The Com-
munication followed the adoption of the EU-US agreement on the US Terrorist Finance Track-
ing Program (TFTP) in 2010. The agreement concluded various series of national, European and 
transatlantic negotiations after the disclosure through public media of the US TFTP in 2006. 
This paper takes stock of the wide range of controversies surrounding this security-focused pro-
gramme with dataveillance capabilities. After stressing the impact of the US TFTP on interna-
tional relations, the paper argues that the EU-US agreement primarily has the effect of shifting 
information-sharing practices from the justice/judicial/penal/criminal investigation framework 
into the security/intelligence/administrative/prevention context as the main rationale. The paper 
then questions the TFTP-related conception of mass intelligence through large-scale databases 
and transnational communication of bulk data in the name of targeted surveillance. Following 
an examination of the project creating an EU system equivalent to the TFTP, the paper empha-
sises the fundamental paradox of transatlantic security matters, in which European criticisms of 
American programmes tend to be ultimately translated into EU imitation of US dataveillance 
practices. 
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Introduction 
The  term  dataveillance  refers  to  “the  systematic  use  of  personal  data  systems  in  the  investigation  or 
monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons”.
1 “[A] variation of ‘surveillance’, [the 
term] emphasises the importance of databases, rather than visual or auditory means of watching over people, 
in the practices of states and companies” to influence, manage, protect or control individuals, social groups 
or populations.
2 Practices of tracking, monitoring and keeping data files on populations for governmental 
purposes  did  not  begin  with  the  rise  of  computer  databases.  The  filing  of  personal  records  has  been 
widespread in different political contexts (democratic and authoritarian) since the 18th century in Europe, for 
instance.
3 While the illusion of novelty must be carefully avoided, technology leapfrogging deserves critical 
attention with regards to data storage and data processing capacity. Thus, the term dataveillance has been 
coined “to describe the surveillance practices that the massive collection and storage of vast quantities of 
personal data have facilitated”.
4 
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lisons-nous  lorsque nous  lisons  un dossier  personnel  de la  Stasi”,  Genèses,  Vol.  3,  No.  52,  2003,  pp.  119-132;  J. 
Schmeidel, Stasi, London: Routledge, 2008. 
4C.J. Bennet, “The Public Surveillance of Personal Data: A Cross-National Analysis”, in D. Lyon and E. Zureik (eds), 
Computers, Surveillance and Privacy, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, pp. 237-259. 2  ANTHONY AMICELLE  
Financial dataveillance is the method of investigation or monitoring through the collection of financial data. 
The systematic use of financial data systems for law enforcement purposes is increasingly associated with 
specific claims of prevention. Financial dataveillance is not only used to produce inculpating evidence in 
order to prosecute and convict offenders, it is also used to collect confidential information and perform social 
network analysis in order to incapacitate suspects before they act. This proactive, intelligence-led approach 
of  financial  policing  is  illustrated  by  the  transatlantic  agreement  in  relation  to  the  Terrorist  Financing 
Tracking Program (TFTP) that has attracted an “unusually high level of public sensitivity”, according to 
Europol officials.
5 
In a letter to the Joint Supervisory Body (JSB), Europol’s independent data protection supervisor, Europol 
Director  Rob  Wainwright  wrote:  “Given  the  sensitivity  of  the  TFTP Agreement  and  its  importance  to 
Europol, I attach a very high priority to ensuring Europol reaches a common understanding with the JSB on 
the issues raised in the Final Inspection Report. As you know some of these issues have received adverse 
public attention recently in a way that has undermined the reputation of Europol. On an urgent basis I wish to 
repair this damage and take steps to ensure that it is not repeated.”
6 
This paper focuses on the main controversies that have emerged since the disclosure of the US TFTP in 
2006: secondary use of commercial  databases for law  enforcement purposes, power imbalances between 
sovereign entities, massive information-sharing without judicial assessment in the name of prevention, bulk 
personal  data transfers  to  a third-country  and  the  European  project  of  a  large-scale  database  to  monitor 
international financial transactions. 
These  controversies  remain  highly  topical  from  at  least  two  perspectives.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
implementation of the EU-US TFTP agreement is still drawing criticism while the project of a European 
terrorist finance tracking system is pending. On the other hand, several of the issues are echoed in the recent 
disclosure  of American  dataveillance  programmes  such  as  PRISM,  which  is  based  on  the  collection  of 
personal data from users of Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Apple, Yahoo, Youtube, Paltalk, AOL and Skype 
in the name of the fight against terrorism.
7 
According to Tonio Borg, the Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy, on behalf of the European 
Commission,  “programmes  such  as  the  so-called  PRISM  and  the  laws  on  the  basis  of  which  such 
programmes are authorised potentially endanger the fundamental right to privacy and to data protection of 
EU citizens […] The European Commission  is concerned about recent  media reports that United States 
authorities are accessing and processing, on a large scale, the data of European Union citizens using major 
US online service providers”.
8 Members of the European Parliament also criticised the US programme as “a 
major breach of trust, non-compliant with EU data protection legislation” and as a problem that is “not only 
about  data  protection,  this  is  about  democracy  and  the  rule  of  law,  which  cannot  be  in  line  with  mass 
surveillance of citizens around the world”.
9 
Similar concerns also greeted the public disclosure in Europe of the US TFTP in 2006. However, an EU 
system equivalent to the TFTP was officially proposed by the European Commission a few years later, in 
2011. From criticism to imitation – is this the fundamental paradox of the European Union in the field of 
security and surveillance? 
This paper starts by summarising the basic facts of the SWIFT affair and the US TFTP, which is based on the 
secondary use of European commercial company databases. Section 2 underlines how the TFTP challenges 
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the international principle of equality between sovereign entities. Section 3 argues that the main result of the 
TFTP agreement is less the transatlantic transfer of personal data than the removal of information-sharing 
practices from the judicial framework in the questionable name of a particular form of prevention. Section 4 
analyses European intra-governmental and inter-institutional tensions in relation to the negotiation of the 
TFTP  agreement.  It  also  questions  Europol’s  vetting  role  regarding  US  requests  of  SWIFT  financial 
messages. Section 5 describes how the TFTP reflects a specific conception of mass intelligence that is based 
on the access to bulk data for targeted search purposes. Finally, Section 6 examines controversies over the 
current project of an EU terrorist finance tracking system (TFTS).     
1.  The SWIFT Affair and the Repurposing Process of Personal Data 
On  23  June  2006,  New  York  Times  journalists  disclosed  the  existence  of  the Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program  that  was  implemented  by  the  US  government  in  September  2001.  This  counter-terrorism 
programme  is  based  on  the  access  to  financial  data  managed  by  the  Society  for  Worldwide  Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). 
SWIFT is “a member-owned cooperative through which the financial world conducts its business operations 
with speed, certainty and confidence”.
10 The company provides worldwide messaging services dedicated to 
the facilitation of international financial transactions. According to official assessments, the SWIFT network 
channels about 80% of the electronic value transfers around the world.
11 In other words, SWIFT is the postal 
service for international finance  in that the company delivers international  mail (i.e. financial  messages) 
between financial institutions. Banking actors are the main users of SWIFT services to make international 
electronic payments and wire transfers for their customers, such as you and me. Central bank representatives 
emphasise  the  systemic  significance  of  SWIFT as a key  infrastructure  of  the  international  financial  and 
payment  system.
12  In  2012,  SWIFT  processed  four  and  half  billion  messages  and  a  daily  average  of 
20,083,128  financial  messages  in  May  2013.
13  For  each  payment  by  a  banking  customer,  the  SWIFT 
message contains the amount of the transaction, the currency, the date, the name of the originator’s bank and 
the recipient client. The message provides information about the beneficiary and the ordering customer such 
as complete names, account numbers, addresses, national identification numbers and other personal data.
14 
The US TFTP is based on the secondary use of SWIFT messages. Since 2001, SWIFT representatives have 
received US requests to provide copies of financial messages to the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) in the name of the ‘War on Terror’.
15 OFAC officials have collected, stored and analysed 
copies of SWIFT messages to detect and monitor terrorist-related transactions. The vast majority of collected 
messages  have  related  to  transactions  concerning  countries  other  than  the  US  as  well  as  to  entities  and 
individuals  other  than  US  organisations  and  US  citizens.  This  massive  access  to  worldwide  financial 
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economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries 
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weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States. 
OFAC acts under Presidential national emergency powers, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose 
controls  on  transactions  and  freeze  assets  under  US  jurisdiction”.  For  further  information,  see 
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messages was technically possible due to the fact that SWIFT ran two operating centres to deliver messaging 
services, one located in the Netherlands and the other located in the US. SWIFT stored all financial messages 
on both servers for 124 days to prevent any problem in case of disputes between financial institutions or data 
loss.
16 Each server held “an exact copy of the data held by the other” server to provide a backup should one 
of the servers crash.
17 
OFAC officials issued administrative production orders (i.e. administrative subpoenas) to the US SWIFT 
operating centre to collect and process data that was originally registered for commercial purposes for a short 
period of time. The TFTP is a clear-cut example of secondary use that “involves data collected for one 
purpose being used for an unrelated purpose without people’s consent”.
18 This repurposing of personal data 
poses questions over three interrelated relationships: the relationship between state security agencies and 
commercial companies that are not providers of security services; the relationship between businesses and 
customers; and the relationship between state representatives and populations. Finally, the repurposing poses 
questions over how security programmes with dataveillance capabilities affect societal structure by altering 
these three interrelated relationships.
19 
“Following the money is one of the most valuable sources of information that we have to identify and locate 
the networks of terrorists and their supporters. If a terrorist associate we are watching sends receives money 
from another person, we know that there is a link between the two individuals. And while terrorist supporters 
may use code names on the phone, when they send or receive money through the banking system, they often 
provide  information  that  yields  the  kind  of  concrete  leads  that  can  advance  an  investigation.  For  these 
reasons, counter-terrorism officials place a heavy premium on financial intelligence. As the 9/11 Commission 
staff pointed out – and as Chairman Hamilton testified before this Committee – ‘following the money to 
identify  terrorist  operatives  and  sympathisers  provides  a  particularly  powerful  tool  in  the  fight  against 
terrorist groups. Use of this tool almost always remains invisible to the general public, but it is a critical part 
of the overall campaign against al Qaeda’. The TFTP was just such an invisible tool”.
20 
Although US Treasury representatives promoted the added value of the TFTP, the secondary use of SWIFT 
messages was seriously criticised, especially in the European Union. The SWIFT headquarters are located in 
Belgium and the company is covered by European legislation on privacy and data protection. Members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs) and representatives of European data protection authorities were concerned 
about the massive exchange of personal data (including European citizens and residents’ data) between a 
European commercial company and a third country without any European safeguards. 
2.  International Relations and the Principle of Equality between Sovereign Entities 
SWIFT messaging services are critical for daily European banking practices. The US interception of SWIFT 
messages meant that OFAC officials collected financial personal data of millions of European citizens and 
residents  from  2001  to  2006  (the  time  of  the  New  York  Times’  disclosure)  without  any  transatlantic 
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March 2007. 
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475, 2008, p. 770. 
19A. Amicelle and G. Favarel-Garrigues, “Financial Surveillance: Who Cares?”, Journal of Cultural Economy, Vol. 5, 
No.  1,  2012, pp.  105-124;  PACT  Consortium,  “Discussion  paper about  the  theoretical  foundations  of  PACT”, The 
Privacy & Security Research Series, No. 2, 2012. 
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negotiation or European agreement regarding safeguards of fundamental rights.
21 Moreover, the US counter-
terrorism programme challenged EU economic sovereignty. Members of the European Parliament and data 
protection  authorities  initially  flagged  the  potential  for  economic  and  industrial  espionage;
22  they  were 
concerned that US Treasury officials could have access to strategic transactions and commercial information 
about European companies. 
Furthermore, the TFTP challenged the principle of equality between sovereign entities, in this case between 
the  European  Union  and  the  United  States. The  United  States’  unilateral access  to  international  SWIFT 
messages illustrates current tensions in international relations regarding forms of asymmetry and domination 
that  are  related  to  the  information  question,  i.e.  “power  asymmetries  as  a  consequence  of  differential 
dissemination of information or, at least, access inequalities to information producing devices”.
23     
The  implementation  of  security  programmes  with  global  dataveillance  capabilities,  such  as  the  TFTP, 
contributes  to  destabilising  the  principle  of  equality  between  sovereign  entities.  This  formal  equality 
represents a key principle of the Westphalian system as the archetype of international order. According to the 
classic conceptualisation of the Westphalian system, international order is based on principles of sovereignty, 
non-intervention, territoriality and formal equality between sovereign actors.
24 While the issue of sovereignty 
has been explicitly tackled in relation to the possibility of economic espionage, the TFTP also touches on 
other Westphalian principles, such as formal equality. The massive collection of personal data affects power 
relationships between sovereign entities regarding rules of information collection and information exchange 
about citizens. 
OFAC  officials  collected  financial  messages  that  circulated  all  over  the  world. As  a result,  US  officials 
accessed third-country citizens’ personal data without the approval of these third countries’ bureaucracies. Of 
course, Westphalian equality has always been understood as a formal principle. The process of bypassing 
other national bureaucracies to collect foreign individuals’ information for security purposes is a traditional 
practice of intelligence. However, the scope of the TFTP represented a step beyond surveillance projects such 
as  ECHELON,  as  it  has  amplified  contemporaneous  forms  of  informational  domination.
25  With  their 
exclusive access to SWIFT messages, US authorities have shaped an asymmetric relationship between the 
United States and other sovereign entities in relation to the growing area of financial intelligence. 
This  issue  of  equality  between  sovereign  entities  was  one  of  the  key  elements  of  the  transatlantic 
negotiations to reach a TFTP agreement after the media disclosure in June 2006. Although the transatlantic 
agreement in relation to the TFTP was signed in 2010, a so-called ‘exit from the crisis’ had already been 
found as early as the end of 2007.
26 SWIFT representatives were under pressure from the European Union 
                                                   
21Nevertheless, for further information about EU actors’ ambiguity, see A. Amicelle and G. Favarel-Garrigues, “La lutte 
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22European Parliament, “European Parliament resolution on the interception of bank transfer data from the SWIFT 
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PNR agreement and the transatlantic dialogue on these issues”, 14 February 2007; Commission de protection de la vie 
privée (Royaume de Belgique), “Avis n°37 relatif à la transmission de données à caractère personnel par la SCRL 
SWIFT  suite aux  sommations  de  l’UST  (OFAC)”,  27  Septembre  2006; Article  29  Data  Protection Working  Party, 
“Opinion  10/2006  on  the  processing  of  personal  data  by  the  society  for  Worldwide  Interbank  Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT)”, 22 November 2006; European Data Protection Supervisor, “EDPS opinion on the role 
of the European Central Bank in the SWIFT case”, Brussels, 1 February 2007. 
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population en Allemagne et en France”, Déviance et Société, Vol. 29, 2005, pp. 259. 
24T. Lapointe, “Système de Westphalie”, in A. Macleod et al. (eds), Relations internationales: Théories et concepts, 
Montréal: Athéna Editions, 2008, pp. 495-498. 
25For  further  information  about ECHELON,  see  D. Campbell,  Surveillance  électronique  planétaire,  Paris: Editions 
Allia, 2006. 
26Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Press release 62nd session”, Brussels, 11 October 2007, p. 1; CNIL (2007), 
28e  rapport  d’activité,  Paris:  La  Documentation  française,  pp.  23-24;  Commission  de  protection  de  la  vie  privée 
(Royaume de Belgique),  “Contrôle et procédure de recommandation à l’égard de la société SWIFT scrl”, Bruxelles, 9 
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over the communication of European bulk data to the US Treasury. As a result, they decided to modify the 
technical architecture of their messaging services that was based on mirror servers in the Netherlands and the 
United  States.  This  modification  consisted  of  creating  a  new  operating  centre  in  Switzerland  to  keep 
European financial messages within the continent. In other words, SWIFT representatives wanted to store 
European SWIFT messages in mirror servers in both the Netherlands and Switzerland, and no longer in the 
US operating centre. 
To  do  so,  they  approved  the  division  of  their  international  messaging  platform  into  two  distinct  zones. 
“Distributed architecture  will partition  messaging  into two zones, the European  messaging zone and the 
Trans-Atlantic messaging zone, with pairs of Operating Centres that store the traffic for each zone. The 
implementation of the messaging zones will take place by the end of 2009.”
27 The European messaging zone 
covers the European Economic Area (EU-27, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein), Switzerland and other 
territories and dependencies of the European Union or associated with European member states. The Trans-
Atlantic zone relates to the United States and its territories, and the other 180 or so SWIFT countries have 
been assigned to the Trans-Atlantic zone by default, though their representatives can request to be reassigned 
to the European zone. This element reminds us that the impact of the TFTP is not only an EU-US issue, as 
“more  than  10,000  financial  institutions  and  corporations  in  212  countries  trust  [SWIFT]  every  day  to 
exchange millions of standardised financial messages”.
28      
The implementation of this new distributed architecture meant that financial messages in the European zone 
would only be registered in the SWIFT operating centres in the Netherlands and Switzerland. Electronic 
traces  in  relation  to  financial  transactions  of  the  European  messaging  zone  would  remain  in  Europe. 
Consequently, OFAC officials could no longer request access to interbank messages that circulate in Europe; 
the  US  TFTP  could  only  be  based  on  SWIFT  messages  that  are  related  to  the  Trans-Atlantic  zone. 
Nevertheless, a reconfiguration of SWIFT was anticipated by US authorities to allow access to European 
financial  transactions  that  are  channelled  through  SWIFT  messaging  services.  Transatlantic  informal 
negotiations resumed in 2009 to allow US TFTP analysts to consult SWIFT messages unrelated to the US 
territory and the Trans-Atlantic zone. In July 2009, the European Commission and the Swedish presidency of 
the European Union were mandated to strike a new deal with the United States. The US presidential change 
from the Bush administration to the Obama administration has not altered its position on the TFTP.   
3.  Prevention as a Legitimation Narrative: Information-Sharing Practices outside 
the Judicial Framework 
MEPs,  representatives  of  data  protection  authorities  and  some  member  states’  delegations  (primarily 
Germany and Austria) criticised the idea of a transatlantic agreement that mainly aimed at ensuring the status 
quo regarding the TFTP.
29 The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), Peter Hustinx, considered that 
“not enough evidence has been provided so far to justify the necessity and the proportionality of such a 
privacy-intrusive  agreement,  which  in  many  ways  overlaps  with  pre-existing  EU  and  international 
instruments in this area”.
30 Regarding pre-existing instruments, Mr. Hustinx primarily referred to the 2003 
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agreement on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United States.
31 
However, a major difference exists between the logic of this agreement of mutual legal assistance and the 
logic of the envisaged TFTP agreement. The 2003 agreement fits perfectly within the legal framework of 
criminal justice. In other words, information exchange was mainly possible to prosecute crimes after they 
occur.  In  contrast,  the  TFTP  is  associated  with  a  particular  logic  of  prevention  that  exceeds  traditional 
practices of criminal investigation in that it does not just aim at finding and prosecuting criminals before they 
reoffend. Moreover, the main aim of the TFTP promoters has been precisely to remove counter-terrorism 
practices from the legal framework of criminal justice in which a judicial/court order is required to access 
information. 
The use of administrative subpoenas and programmes such as the TFTP reflects the promotion of a specific 
form of prevention: “In combating terrorism, prevention is key. The entire Department of Justice has shifted 
its focus to a proactive approach to terrorism, reflecting the reality that it is not good enough to wait to 
prosecute terrorist crimes after they occur. For the law-enforcement officers responsible for staying a step 
ahead of the terrorists in these investigations, time is critical. Even a brief delay in an investigation may be 
disastrous. Therefore, these officers need tools that allow them to obtain information and act as quickly as 
possible. Administrative subpoenas are one tool that will  enable investigators to avoid costly delays. An 
administrative subpoena is an order from a government official to a third party, instructing the recipient to 
produce certain information. Because the subpoena is issued directly by an agency official, it can be issued 
as quickly as the development of an investigation requires”.
32 This promotion of administrative productive 
orders  (i.e.  administrative  subpoenas  without  prior  judicial  oversight)  for  counter-terrorism  purposes 
illustrates  the  legitimation  narrative  of  the  TFTP  and  other  US  security  programmes  with  dataveillance 
capabilities, such as PRISM. 
While prevention is clearly presented as the ultimate goal of counter-terrorism, this stance refers to a specific 
form of prevention that overlaps with the ambivalent appropriation of military pre-emption in the context of 
intelligence-led policing.
33 Here, prevention does not fit within the classic understanding of addressing the 
root causes of criminal or political violence. Neither is this notion of prevention associated with another 
traditional  form  of  prevention,  i.e.  ‘deterrence’,  as  it  is  optimistic  to  expect  any  deterrent  effect  from  a 
programme that has been conceived as an invisible and secret tool. The TFTP highlights the significance of a 
third, proactive meaning of prevention to ‘act before the other’ in order to prevent potential harmful events 
from  happening.
34 Official justifications for accessing  detailed personal  data are less focused  on finding 
evidence  to  prosecute  and  punish  criminals  than  on  amassing  intelligence  to  pre-emptively  disrupt  and 
incapacitate suspects.
35   
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As  a  result,  the  main  purpose  of  the  transatlantic  agreement  on  the  TFTP  is  not  the  transnational 
communication  of  financial  personal  data,  as  legal  instruments  already  exist  for  this. Above  all,  TFTP 
promoters  have  aimed  to  remove  information-sharing  practices  from  the  justice/judicial/penal/criminal 
investigation  framework  and  incorporate  them  within  the  logic  of 
security/intelligence/administrative/prevention.  This  specific  logic  of  prevention  has  been  the  main 
legitimation narrative of the US TFTP and the transatlantic agreement. However, this added value of the 
TFTP is not substantiated in any of the TFTP case examples described in official reports.
36 Every single 
detailed example is related to an investigation after a violent event occurred, never before. 
The Norwegian case of Anders Behring Breivik on 22 July 2011 has recently been offered as a “particularly 
striking example” in which the TFTP was used “to fight and prevent terrorism”.
37 “TFTP-based information 
helped Norwegian and other European investigators, including Europol, to identify within hours the channels 
through which Breivik collected and moved the funds that he used for the preparation of his brutal attacks. 
The more knowledge is gained on the financial patterns of such terrorists (‘lone wolves’), the better are law 
enforcement and other authorities prepared to understand the thinking of such individuals and ultimately to 
prevent similar attacks”.
38 
Although the Breivik case is used to illustrate the relevance of the TFTP, the case mainly serves to weaken 
the argument for the added value of the programme and its preventive legitimation. According to the official 
statement, the TFTP provided information about Breivik’s profile (i.e. financial patterns) that can be used to 
monitor and prevent future similar events. While one should critically analyse this claim of the preventive 
ability to connect the dots of possible future events through profiling practices, we can certainly question the 
specific added value of the TFTP regarding access to Breivik’s financial data. The investigation started after 
Breivik’s crimes, not before; TFTP was only valuable because it was directed at a criminal event that already 
happened. Pre-existing legal instruments (i.e. mutual legal assistance) and law enforcement institutions (i.e. 
financial intelligence units) could have been used to obtain the same amount of information about Breivik’s 
financial patterns. The TFTP brought little benefit, if any. 
However,  before  this  happens,  MEPs  rejected  the  first  version  of  the  transatlantic  TFTP  agreement  in 
February 2010, and a revised version was adopted several months later with a new vetting role for Europol.
39 
4.  The Transatlantic Agreement and Europol 
The Rejection of the First Agreement: Intra-Governmental and Inter-Institutional Tensions 
As  already  mentioned,  MEPs  criticised  the  new  EU-US  negotiations  in  2009  that aimed  at  reaching  an 
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agreement  to  ensure  transatlantic  data  transfers  regardless  of  SWIFT’s  new  technical  architecture.  A 
resolution  was  adopted  at  the  European  Parliament  in  September  2009  to  highlight  privacy  and  data 
protection concerns.
40 Moreover, MEPs were still concerned about the possibility of economic and industrial 
espionage  and  they  requested  additional  safeguards  and  specific  mechanisms,  such  as  a  reciprocity 
mechanism  “obliging  the  competent  US  authorities  to  transfer  relevant  financial  messaging  data  to  the 
competent  EU  authorities,  upon  request”.  There  was  also  no  unanimous  position  at  the  Council  of  the 
European Union in October 2009, with the delegations of Austria and Germany expressing concerns about 
data  protection  safeguards.  Germany  was  quickly  identified  by  US  authorities  as  the  critical  actor  in 
negotiations  to  strike  a  new  deal.  US  diplomats  “were  ‘astonished  to  learn  how  quickly  rumours  about 
alleged US economic espionage’ had taken root among German politicians who opposed the program”.
41 
German  concerns  highlighted  intra-European  dissensions,  while  US  intensive  lobbying  of  the  German 
delegation resulted in German intra-governmental controversies. 
Transatlantic negotiations in relation to the TFTP took place at the same time as Angela Merkel’s re-election 
in September/October 2009. This re-election ended the grand coalition with the Social Democratic Party in 
Germany (SPD) that existed from 2005 until 2009. The new federal coalition was formed by Merkel’s group 
in  Parliament  –  Christian  Democratic  Union  (CDU)  and  Christian  Social  Union  (CSU)  –  and  the  Free 
Democratic Party (FDP). These partners did not share the same opinion of the TFTP. Several FDP leaders 
had already expressed their concerns when the Swedish EU presidency received the negotiated mandate. 
According to a US diplomatic cable disclosed by WikiLeaks, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (a leading 
figure of the FDP who became justice minister under the new coalition) “had inserted language into the 
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition agreement specifically addressing the TFTP negotiations and directing Germany to 
call upon the EU to work towards a higher level of data protection”.
42 
In response to this reluctance, US authorities put pressure on the German government to support the adoption 
of the new TFTP agreement at the EU Council on 30 November 2009. “[US] Ambassador Murphy met with 
[German] Interior Minister de Maizière on November 27 and urged him to support US-EU negotiations on an 
interim TFTP agreement, to which de Maizière indicated that he would abstain from voting on the agenda 
item at the November 30 COREPER meeting. De Maizière's decision, which followed a German request to 
shorten the duration of the interim agreement to nine months rather than twelve, facilitated the passing of the 
agreement as Germany was the strongest holdout. De Maizière's decision followed two weeks of intense 
lobbying in Berlin, Brussels and Washington by the Embassy in Berlin, USEU, the Departments of Treasury, 
State and Justice and the NSC. The campaign included calls by Secretaries Clinton, Geithner, the Attorney 
General  and  the  National  Security  Advisor  to  their  German  counterparts.  State  Department  Counter-
Terrorism  Coordinator  Benjamin  urged  support  for  the  agreement  during  a  two-day  visit  to  Berlin. 
Ambassador Murphy twice wrote to all five relevant ministers (Interior, Justice, Finance, Chancellery, and 
MFA) and made repeated calls to senior decision-makers, stressing the importance of the interim agreement 
and the need for Germany to not block it. The DCM, Econ M/C, and staff from multiple embassy sections 
heavily engaged on the issue as well. De Maizière (CDU) stressed that his decision was not an easy one 
given that the Christian Democrat/Social Union (CDU/CSU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition had 
differing views on the TFTP program”.
43 
On one hand, the interior minister’s decision to abstain from voting was welcomed by US authorities. On the 
other  hand,  his  decision  created  significant  tensions  within  the  German  coalition. Tensions  between  the 
CDU/CSU and the FDP added to the classic struggles in Germany between interior minister and justice 
minister. Thomas De Maizière overruled his ministerial colleague, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, who 
complained that her views were ignored and that the decision has "upset millions of citizens of Europe”.
44 
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The EU-US TFTP agreement also reinforced tensions between EU institutions. Indeed, the agreement was 
adopted  at the  EU  Council  on  the  last  day  before  the  implementation  of  the  Lisbon Treaty  granted  the 
European Parliament consent over international agreements such as the TFTP. Spain took the EU presidency 
one month later, and the Spanish permanent representative to the EU was “very concerned that the interim 
agreement on TFTP was reached on the last possible day before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, which 
meant that Spain needed to be serious about damage control in the wake of suspicions that the United States 
and the EU Council colluded to pre-empt Parliamentary action on the agreement”.
45 Ultimately, members of 
the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Parliament Committee (LIBE) called to reject the agreement on 
5 February 2010 due to concerns about data protection as well as judicial recourse and  lack  of EU-US 
reciprocity regarding security practices.
46 
The TFTP agreement came into force on 1
st February and the LIBE proposal was adopted at the European 
Parliament on 11
th February (the published vote was 378 in favour and 196 against, with 31 abstentions). The 
TFTP agreement  was therefore invalidated only 11 days after its official  entry into force. This rejection 
represented a milestone event, with MEPs using their veto right (attributed by the Lisbon Treaty) for the very 
first  time.  To  a  certain  extent,  the  European  Parliament  has  become  a  fully-fledged  institutional  actor 
regarding EU-US security  matters since this point in time. A revised version  of the first agreement  was 
finally adopted by MEPs in July 2010 as a result of further negotiation and with additional safeguards.
47 
Europol’s Vetting Role in Practice 
Two major last-minute elements were introduced in the second TFTP agreement after MEPs’ rejection of the 
initial deal. First, the appointment of a European overseer in the United States was presented as an additional 
safeguard to “ensure that the [SWIFT] provided data [for the TFTP] is only accessed in cases where there is 
a clear nexus to terrorism or its financing, and the search of the data is narrowly tailored”.
48 An overseer was 
recruited on a temporary basis in 2010, and the permanent EU overseer has been in place since May 2011. 
He has joined the former team of ‘independent overseers’ who have been recruited by SWIFT representatives 
to audit and supervise TFTP analysts’ searches and uses of financial messages. 
Second, the European Union’s law enforcement agency (Europol) has been designated as the public body to 
monitor OFAC official’s requests for SWIFT data to be transmitted from Europe. Now, US Treasury officials 
have to obtain Europol authorisation before each transfer of financial personal data that is stored in Europe 
by SWIFT (in the Netherlands and Switzerland). Europol staff’s mission consists of checking whether US 
Treasury administrative production orders are sufficiently substantiated for counter-terrorism purposes and 
respectful of the agreement requirements. US requests also need to be “tailored as narrowly as possible in 
order  to  minimise  the  amount  of  data  requested,  taking  due  account  of  past  and  current  terrorism  risk 
analyses focused on message types and geography as well as perceived terrorism threats and vulnerabilities, 
geographic, threat, and vulnerability analyses; and not seek any data relating to the Single Euro Payments 
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Area”.
49 Europol officials can block transatlantic transfers of financial personal data if they conclude that US 
requests do not comply with the requirements of the transatlantic agreement. To do so, a new Europol unit 
has been created within the Operations Department – the O9 (TFTP) unit.
50 
Europol’s  vetting  role  has  modified  TFTP  supervision  in  relation  to  principles  of  necessity  and 
proportionality  of  US  access  to  messages  of  international  financial  transactions.  Although  SWIFT 
representatives claimed that they “narrowed the scope of the [US Treasury] subpoenas to a limited set of 
data”,
  51 Europol’s check has been promoted as the guarantee to  ensure that US requests are tailored as 
narrowly as possible. Moreover, Europol’s new role has been presented as the official response to MEPs’ 
request for the designation of an EU public authority with the responsibility to review demands from the US 
Treasury Department. However, Europol’s new role has also represented a significant concession by MEP’s, 
as Parliament resolutions called for a public judicial body to review US requests and not for a public law-
enforcement body such as Europol.
52 
The choice of Europol to discharge the new vetting  responsibilities  has a concrete  effect on the type of 
verification that is enforced. While a judicial body would have checked US requests based on legal criteria 
and a data protection body would have checked US requests from a data protection perspective, Europol 
analysts  assess  US  requests  “in  the  light  of  operational  considerations  and  security  needs”.
53  From  this 
perspective, the attempt to remove the TFTP and information-sharing practices from the judicial framework 
has been a complete success. Furthermore, Europol’s so-called ‘guarantee’ has been seriously challenged 
during the very first months of implementation of the transatlantic agreement. 
In March 2011, representatives of the Europol Joint Supervisory Body (JSB) detailed the main conclusions 
of their first review of Europol’s new task.
54 The JSB president underlined that “the most important finding 
of the inspection was that the  written requests Europol received were not specific enough to allow it to 
decide whether to approve or deny them. It was found that the US requests were too general and too abstract 
to allow proper evaluation of the necessity of the requested data transfers. Despite this, Europol approved 
each  request  it  received”.
55  Europol  representatives  notified  JSB  inspectors  that  Europol  analysts  also 
received  oral  briefings  from  US  Treasury  officials  to  approve  requests  that  they  reviewed.  JSB 
representatives rejected this argument because confidential oral information is, by definition, impossible to 
supervise. 
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As a result, various actors underlined what they considered to be a supervisory gap in the implementation of 
the  transatlantic  agreement  on  the  TFTP.  Following  the  JSB’s  first  inspection,  Europol  was  seriously 
criticised over its verification task, especially in the European Parliament Committee  on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE).
56 MEPs such as Sarah Ludford stated that “entrusting this task to Europol 
is like putting the fox in charge of the chicken coop”.
57 Although the European Commission review team 
published a much more positive report on the first six months of implementation of the TFTP agreement, 
members of the review team also supported the JSB’s concerns about the opacity of US oral briefings.
58 
Finally, representatives of the German delegation at the European Council were concerned about a general 
lack  of  transparency  from  the  European  Commission  and  Europol  in  relation  to  the  TFTP.
59  Europol 
representatives eventually sent further information to the European Parliament one month after the JSB’s 
critical inspection.
60 
In November 2011, JSB officials conducted their second inspection of Europol’s implementation of its task 
under  the  TFTP  agreement.  While  their  general  conclusions  highlighted  that  “Europol  has  made  some 
progress”, they also noticed various issues regarding US requests for SWIFT data that have always been 
accepted  by  Europol.
61  They  made  “clear  that  the  US  must  improve  the  information  provided  in  the 
requests”.  They  claimed  that  “oral  information  provided  by  the  US  to  Europol  in  regular,  confidential 
briefing sessions apparently still plays a role in the verification of the requests. More transparency by the US 
is needed to allow Europol to verify the requests more effectively and to allow proper internal and external 
supervision”.
62 
Although the director of Europol denied that US requests were mainly based on oral briefings, MEPs such as 
Sophie In’t Veld criticised Europol for granting “requests orally over the telephone. It is a complete violation 
of  the  term  of  the  agreement”.
63  This  criticism  did  not  appear  in  the  second  joint  review  of  the 
implementation  of  the  agreement  published  by  the  European  Commission  in  December  2012.  “The  EU 
review  team  believes  that  cooperation  between  Europol  and  the  Treasury  has  resulted  in  substantial 
improvements […] and  is satisfied that this process  is proceeding in  compliance  with the agreement”.
64 
Nevertheless, the existence and potential significance of US oral briefings remains a matter of controversy. 
Another matter of controversy is the scope of US requests and the perpetuation of bulk data transfers. 
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5.  Mass Intelligence and Targeted Surveillance 
Although US requests have to be narrowly tailored, they still result in bulk data transfers. The EU review 
team and JSB inspectors have both agreed that Europol has received a US request on average every month, 
with  each request covering a period of one  month.
65 “The requests – when seen as a group – therefore 
essentially cover a continuous time period. To be clear, this means that one consequence of the agreement, as 
it is currently being implemented, is that data relating to certain financial transactions are provided by the 
designated provider [SWIFT] to the US for a time frame containing every single day of the year, year on 
year”.
66 Any transfer of SWIFT data from Europe to the United States requires Europol authorisation, but the 
scope  of  each  transfer  is  still  extremely  broad  as  US requests  have  never  been  individualised  since  the 
creation of the TFTP. 
OFAC officials’ subpoenas have  never been  individualised since 2001 because SWIFT operating centres 
cannot  technically  deal  with  targeted  queries  due  to  the  encrypted  structure  of  each  SWIFT  financial 
message. During the period from September 2001 to June 2006 (the time of the New York Times’ disclosure), 
each US request was “materially, territorially and in time very wide: these subpoenas are issued for any 
transactions which relate or may relate to terrorism, relate to X number of countries and jurisdictions, on a 
date, or ‘from … to …’ dates ranging from one to several weeks, within and outside the US”.
67 “The SWIFT 
system isn’t made in the way that you can say I want M. X’s transfers on the 16
th of November, the 8
th of 
June and 9
th of August. It’s not the system, you always get a bulk”.
68 
These statements remain valid today. US officials do not immediately target and collect individualised data 
pertaining  to  a  specific  suspect.  First,  they  request  bulk  data  of  SWIFT  messages  in  connection  with  a 
specific time-span (one month, on average) and specific geographic areas such as between two countries. 
Then, the wide range of ‘subpoenaed message’ is entered into a US Treasury searchable database. Finally, 
US TFTP analysts use their own tools to launch specific searches within the searchable, large-scale database 
in order to open relevant SWIFT messages.
69 
The TFTP illustrates a specific conception of intelligence that is different from a classic form of espionage 
that entails intensive monitoring of small groups of individuals, mostly through human means. The TFTP 
represents mass intelligence through databases and transnational communication of bulk data of personal 
information  about  millions  of  individuals  in  order  to  monitor  terrorist  suspects.  This  conception  of 
intelligence  involves  security  programmes  with  dataveillance  capabilities  to  extract  information  from 
electronic traces left by individuals in their daily life. It also involves computer tools for collecting, filtering, 
processing, sharing and disseminating this information. 
Paradoxically,  mass  intelligence  is  officially  justified  in  the  name  of  targeted  searches.  US  Treasury 
representatives  have  consistently  claimed  that  “data  provided  by  SWIFT  is  searched  to  extract  only 
information  that  is  related  to  an  identified,  pre-existing  terrorism  investigation”.
70  Despite  widespread 
European concerns about data-mining practices, US authorities have asserted that they have never conducted 
any  fishing  expeditions  into  the  US  Treasury’s  searchable  database,  or  any  data-mining  processes  and 
automated  profiling  initiatives.  According  to  US  statements  since  2006  until  now,  “no  search  may  be 
conducted  on  data  unless  a  TFTP  investigator  provides  pre-existing  information  demonstrating  a  nexus 
                                                   
65Ibid. 
66Joint Supervisory Body, “Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP Agreement) - Second inspection by the Europol 
Joint Supervisory Body”, 21 March 2012. 
67Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 10/2006 on the processing of personal data by the society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)”, Brussels, 22 November 2006. 
68Interview  with  European  official,  European  Commission,  Directorate  General  Justice,  Liberty  and  Security,  June 
2008. 
69Council of the European Union, “Information Note: EU-US agreement on the processing and transfer of financial 
messaging data for purposes of the US terrorist Finance Tracking Program”, Brussels, November 2009. 
70Processing of EU originating Personal Data by United States Treasury Department for Counter Terrorism Purposes — 
‘SWIFT’, OJ 2007, C 166/18, p. 4. 14  ANTHONY AMICELLE  
between  the  subject  of  the  search  and  terrorism  or  its  financing”.
71 The TFTP  is  mainly  promoted  as a 
programme to  visualise “terrorist networks” through  the use of pre-existing information (i.e. a terrorism 
nexus) about known suspects to perform social network analysis in order to map their financial connections 
and  so  their  potential  relationships  with  unknown  terrorists.
72  From  this  perspective,  TFTP analysts  are 
primarily focused on known individuals who fall into this so-called terrorism nexus. The critical issue is less 
data mining and algorithmic profiling than social network analysis derived from the terrorism nexus. 
In other words, the critical questions are: Who falls into the terrorism nexus as defined by US agencies, and 
how?
73 What is the suspicion threshold? How is social network analysis performed? To what extent do US 
TFTP analysts go beyond the visualisation of known (i.e. terrorism nexus) suspects’ financial relationships? 
In other words, to what extent do they analyse the other financial relationships of people who also have 
financial relationships with suspects, and so on? 
With regards to the period from 2001 until 2006, US Treasury representatives notified that TFTP analysts 
opened and analysed less than 1% of the subset of SWIFT messages that were stored in their database. This 
very low percentage was cited to argue that the TFTP is a targeted surveillance scheme that is based on a pre-
existing terrorism nexus. However, this statistic should be viewed in relation to the total number of collected 
messages in order to get a clearer picture of the scope of TFTP data processing. Although no exact figure has 
been  provided  by  the  US  authorities  since  2001,  SWIFT  officials  confirmed  that  they  received  64  US 
requests from September 2001 to June 2006.
74 As already mentioned, each request covered several weeks 
and several geographic areas. With daily SWIFT traffic of more than ten million messages, we can easily 
estimate  that  OFAC  officials  collected  several  hundred  million  messages  during  five  years. As  a result, 
although less than 1% seems to be very low at first glance, less than 1% of several hundred  million  of 
messages still represents a huge amount of processed personal data. 
The principle of bulk transfer of personal data by SWIFT to the US government has remained one of the 
main concerns for MEPs and representatives of the European data protection authorities. While the transfer 
of bulk data of millions of innocent individuals for targeted searches on terrorist suspects is currently allowed 
under the transatlantic agreement, European officials are discussing a legal and technical framework for the 
extraction of data on EU territory. To create this, the next step would be an EU system equivalent to the US 
TFTP to stop transfers of bulk data, and this is the current issue at stake. 
6.  From Criticism to Imitation? The Project of an EU Terrorist Finance Tracking 
System 
“The  agreement  also  takes  into  account  the  European  Parliament’s  call  for  a  “two-step  approach”,  i.e. 
initially allowing for transfers of bulk data until an EU system equivalent to the TFTP is established. This 
will result in more targeted transfers of data in the future”.
75 
The  possibility  of  a  European  terrorist  finance  tracking  system  is  formally  included  in  the  current 
transatlantic agreement. It was first introduced in September 2009 by a European Parliament resolution, 
which “note[d] that it may be useful for the Commission to evaluate the necessity of setting up a European 
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TFTP”.
76  With  this  proposal,  MEPs  aimed  at  stopping  transatlantic  communication  of  bulk  data  by  a 
commercial company (SWIFT) to a third country (the United States). The inclusion of this option in the five-
year  agreement  has  been  presented  as  European  Parliament  victory  in  the  name  of  data  protection  and 
fundamental rights. “The key to the deal for the European Parliament is the eventual elimination of ‘bulk’ 
data transfers. In exchange for backing the agreement, MEPs won an undertaking that work on setting up an 
EU equivalent to the US Terrorism Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), which would preclude the need for 
bulk data transfers, will start within 12 months. Once Europe has a system enabling it to analyse data on its 
own territory, it need only transfer data relating to a specific terrorist track”.
77 
Various  European  officials,  including  the  EU  counter-terrorism  coordinator,  supported  the  Parliament’s 
proposal to promote the creation of an equivalent EU system. However, Gilles de Kerchove supported the 
EU system not simply in the name of data protection, he mainly justified it as “the development of a more 
equal  partnership  with  the  US”  regarding  security  and  intelligence  practices.
78 This  illustrates  again  the 
significance  of  the  information  question  and  the  critical  issue  of  equality  between  sovereign  entities. 
Regarding  the  project  of  an  EU  equivalent  system,  European  security  actors  are  less  motivated  by  data 
protection  concerns  than  the  end  of  the  US  informational  monopoly  on  international  financial  data  for 
security purposes.    
As a result, the initial consensus on an equivalent EU system has been highly paradoxical. The idea of setting 
up  a  European  TFTP  has  been  officially  associated  with  MEPs’  disposition  to  take  into  account  data 
protection in particular, and fundamental rights in general. However, the official argument of data protection 
has made possible the idea of a security project that was unthinkable a few years ago due also to concerns 
over fundamental rights, i.e. the project of a supranational EU security programme to collect, centralise and 
monitor huge amounts of personal data in relation to international financial transactions. “I have recently 
heard that SWIFT decided to change its network architecture. SWIFT decided to create a new operating 
centre  in  Switzerland.  Their  decision  would  mean  that  European  data  would  be  only  stored  in  Europe. 
Frankly, that is bad news for European intelligence services because we will never have the political ability 
to pass a SWIFT mechanism [i.e. TFTP] in Europe”.
79 The European context has slightly changed since this 
interview in 2007 with the emergence of an unlikely combination of conflicting interests that support the 
careful study of an EU TFTS.     
In 2010, the European Commission was invited to submit to the European Parliament and the Council a legal 
and  technical  framework  to  extract  US requested  data  on  European  soil.  In  July  2011,  three  options  in 
relation  to  an  EU  terrorist  finance  tracking  system  were  presented  in  a  communication  from  the 
Commission.
80  These  options  were  focused  on  the  operationalisation  of  an  EU  TFTS  and  the  possible 
creation of an EU searchable database of SWIFT messages that can be accessed by member states’ national 
agencies (i.e. national financial intelligence units). Each option follows the same general scheme: first, EU 
requests  to  SWIFT;  second,  collection  and  storage  of  requested  data  in  a  new  EU  large-scale  database; 
finally,  a  “targeted  search”  of  the  EU  database  and  further  analysis  of  the  search  results.  However,  the 
options are very different from each other. They reflect different conceptions of European cooperation in the 
field of security, i.e. European integration and Europol as a European security hub vs. inter-governmentalism 
and  national  agencies  as  the  main  security  actors.  The  European  Commission’s  options  have  attracted 
criticism from various perspectives and various groups of actors. 
The  strongest  criticism  has  been  expressed  by  MEPs  and  representatives  of  European  data  protection 
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authorities. They are opposed to every single option in the communication from the Commission in relation 
to the project of an EU TFTS. “The requirement for a prior filtering of data within the EU is supported by the 
EDPS [European Data Protection Supervisor], as it would prevent the sending of bulk data to a third country. 
However,  the  Communication  goes  beyond  the  acknowledged  purpose  of  filtering  data  in  the  EU,  as  it 
clearly indicates that the ‘system should not be set up just to provide relevant information to US authorities’, 
as the authorities of the member states ‘have a real interest in the results of such a system as well’”.
 81 
In the interests of data protection, MEPs have called for a two-step approach but their call, in effect, is to 
imitate  the  US  programme  that  they  had  previously  criticised.  Data  protection  claims  are  paradoxically 
interpreted  as  incentives  for  a  European  security  programme  with  dataveillance  capabilities  that  is 
particularly  intrusive  regarding  individuals’  right  to  privacy. According  to  the  European  data  protection 
supervisor, “the Communication therefore seems to legitimise the setting up of a whole new TFTS scheme, 
in an EU-specific context, on the basis of the existing TFTP agreement. In other words, the Communication 
seems to justify the introduction of a new system which invades the privacy of EU citizens for the benefit of 
the authorities of EU member states while using as a justification the assessment of the utility of a system 
conceived and implemented to allow the US authorities to pursue their own investigation linked to terrorism. 
The  EDPS  has  strong  doubts  about  this  approach,  which  does  not  appear  to  respect  the  principles  of 
necessity and proportionality”.
82 
From this perspective, the Commission’s communication can be seen as an exercise of function creep, i.e. 
“the  addition  of  new  features  beyond  the  scope  of  the  original  project”,
83  in  relation  to  MEP’s  original 
project.  Furthermore,  the  communication  tends  to  promote  function  creep  in  relation  to  the  original  US 
TFTP.  What  if  the  scope  of  the  EU  project  of  TFTS  is  broader  than  that  of  the  US  programme?  The 
Commission’s communication has briefly opened this debate with the statement that “there is little doubt that 
such access [to financial messaging data] would also be a valuable tool for combating other forms of serious 
crime, in particular organised crime and money laundering”.
84 
Finally,  tensions  between  security  professionals  are  also  framed  by  the  Commission’s  options,  which 
illustrate conflicting visions of Security Europe. The implementation of option one or two would reinforce 
the significance of Europol (and Eurojust, to a lesser extent). These options promote much more centralised 
forms of European cooperation, with the EU TFTS database managed by Europol. With reference to the 
current TFTP  practices,  the  EU  review  team,  which  is  headed  by  a  senior  Commission  official,  clearly 
supports  Europol  as  the  European  Union’s  operational  hub.  “The  EU  review  team  is  aware  that  the 
Agreement does not contain any obligations for member states to proceed through Europol and that they 
continue to be able to submit requests for TFTP searches directly to the Treasury. However, in order to 
improve the EU’s response to terrorism and its financing and to control the application of the Agreement’s 
safeguards, it would be very useful to have Europol as the EU’s single contact point or, where requests are 
directly submitted to the Treasury, to have the member states inform Europol of such requests in a systematic 
and  timely  manner,  at  least  in  all  those  cases  in  which  the  request  is  generated  by  law  enforcement 
authorities”.
85 In contrast, the third option of the communication is associated with a process of cooperation 
that would primarily involve national agencies (i.e. financial intelligence units) rather than Europol. National 
delegations,  including  France,  support  this  intergovernmental  option  that  gives  the  lead  to  national 
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authorities rather than to Europol in operating the EU TFTS database.
86 
Once again, the information question plays a critical role in the three options. Here, it is not related to power 
relationships  between  sovereign  entities,  but  to  power  relationships  between  national  and  supranational 
security  agencies  in  Europe.  The  creation  of  the  EU  TFTS  would  represent  a  tremendously  symbolic 
resource for the security agency (or agencies) that will be chosen to manage the EU large-scale database. The 
redistribution of power within the field of European security is one of the key controversies of this project. 
Conclusion 
The paper has examined the main controversies in relation to the US Terrorist Finance Tracking Program. 
Based  on  this  examination,  the  following  conclusion  highlights  several  key  findings  and  makes 
recommendations regarding the transatlantic agreement and the project of an equivalent EU system. 
First of all, the rationale of the current transatlantic agreement deserves further attention. Indeed, the logic of 
the TFTP relegates the classic legal-criminal procedures to the service of preventive access to personal data. 
It  circumvents  the  justice/judicial/penal/criminal  investigation  framework  based  on  the 
security/intelligence/administrative/prevention  rationale.  While  prevention  is  promoted  as  the  main 
justification for various programmes including the TFTP, a clear-cut political debate would be welcomed in 
relation to the use of the multifaceted notion of ‘prevention’ in the field of security. The same word covers 
many different things. 
Promoting  the  prevention  of  “security  threats”  through  “targeted  development  assistance,  strategies  for 
reducing poverty, or restoration programmes for natural or manmade disasters”
87 is completely different from 
a  posture  of  deterrence  or  the  current  “shift  towards  dataveillance,  proactivity  and  prevention”.
88 These 
elements are not mutually exclusive, but it seems necessary to clarify them and their hierarchy in European 
security  strategy.  While  there  is  “an  urgent  need  for  a  uniform  legal  definition  of  the  concept  of 
‘profiling’”
89,  there  is  also  a  need  to  clarify  the  meaning  of  prevention,  as  this  notion  is  used  as  the 
legitimation narrative of security-focused programmes with dataveillance capabilities. Of particular concern 
is  the  duplication  and  overlap  of  security  measures  in  the  name  of  the 
security/intelligence/administrative/prevention  logic,  although  the  preventive  added  value  of  the  new 
measures is not based on evidence and has not been demonstrated in practice.   
Second, Europol’s vetting role constitutes a tricky compromise. It has been widely presented as a major 
concession by TFTP supporters to MEPs’ concerns, but it can also be interpreted as a significant concession 
by MEPs to TFTP supporters as well. European deputies called for an EU public judicial body to check US 
data requests, but a law-enforcement agency has been designated. The mandatory assessment of US demands 
is  exclusively  based  on  operational  considerations  and  security  needs.  The  implementation  of  this 
verification task has emerged as a critical matter in the context of confidential oral briefings and Europol’s 
acceptance of every single US requests of transatlantic data transfers until now. 
Although the Joint Supervisory Body of Europol is involved in reviewing the practices of the Europol 09 
unit, there are grounds for more inclusion of EU “freedom agencies” to reinforce transparency, accountability 
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and, ultimately, trust. The inclusion of EU bodies such as the EDPS and the Article 29 Working Party
90 
should be seen as an efficient way to respond to the “public sensitivity” noted by Europol officials in order to 
avoid  further  controversies.  With  reference  to  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  the  ‘de-pillarisation’  process  and  the 
negotiation of a new EU legal framework for data protection and privacy, the review mechanisms in place 
should  be  reconsidered. As  already  mentioned  in  other  studies,  “supervisory  bodies  within  EU  agencies 
should at the very least be organised into a network, and a common supervision system under the EDPS 
should  be  established”.
91  This  framework  of  oversight  will  be  all  the  more  welcome  for  assessing  the 
operational move towards mass intelligence, large-scale databases and “global data transfers”.
92 
Third, the project of an equivalent EU system to the US TFTP is highly paradoxical in that it imitates what 
has previously been harshly criticised. While the possibility of an EU system was initially justified by the 
European Parliament to restrict transatlantic transfers of bulk data, the current proposal extends financial 
dataveillance  and  even  mentions  the  possibility  of  adding  new  features  beyond  the  scope  of  the  US 
programme. In other words, the call by MEPs for more data protection has led to the Commission’s proposal 
for less privacy. A general discussion about the adequate articulation of privacy and data protection rights is 
all the more important to provide a proper basis for examining the project of an EU terrorist finance tracking 
system. Although there are various overlaps and interrelations between both rights, “much can be learned 
from making and ascertaining the differences in scope, rationale and logic between privacy on the one hand, 
and data protection on the other”.
93    
The main purpose of data protection consists of regulating the processing of personal data by introducing 
procedural safeguards to protect fundamental rights. Data protection regulations aim at ensuring transparency 
and accountability for data record‐holders. Those regulations are not intended to block data processing, but 
to guarantee its channelling and control. According to Serge Gutwirth and Paul de Hert, data protection can 
be understood as a “transparency tool” intended to compel data record‐holders to “fair information practices” 
or “good practices”.
94 This “transparency tool” is focused  on issues of oversight and legal requirements 
regarding  data  processing.  Privacy,  on  the  other  hand,  can  be  framed  as  an  “opacity  tool”  intended  to 
establish limits regarding interference by the state and commercial actors.
95 While data protection refers to a 
“regulated acceptance” of legitimate data processing, privacy refers to a “prohibition” of illegitimate and 
excessive  use  of  power.
96  Thus,  the  “opacity  tool”  (privacy)  is  focused  on  the  “necessity”  of  a  certain 
security-focused programme with surveillance capabilities in a democratic society. 
The opportunity and the design of an EU TFTS should be critically discussed from this privacy perspective, 
at  least.  To  what  extent  is  EU  imitation  of  the  US  TFTP  necessary  in  European  democratic  society? 
Furthermore, the current negotiation of a new European legal framework for data protection and privacy 
should strongly address the issue of third-country data transfer/processing and the critical “lacuna in EU law 
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and policy regarding private sector and law enforcement cooperation”.
97   
The  fundamental  paradox  resulting  from  MEPs’  intervention  in  the  TFTP  negotiation  should  also  be 
emphasised. While the European Parliament now fully engages with EU-US security matters, MEPs also run 
the risk of further legitimising the European reproduction of US programmes that they previously denounced 
as problematic. 
Finally,  European  concerns  have  been  focused  on  the  massive  transfer  of  personal  data  (including  EU 
citizens’ data) between a European commercial company (SWIFT) and a third country (the United States). 
However, access to SWIFT data is not only an EU-US issue, as SWIFT messaging services are officially 
delivered in 212 countries. SWIFT’s new technical architecture, Europol’s vetting role and the project of EU 
equivalent system have caused a slight re-balancing in the power relationships between the European Union 
and the United States. However, the situation has remained unchanged regarding third countries and their 
citizens all over the world. Democratic debate of the TFTP and any other US security programme of global 
dataveillance should move beyond Euro-centrism. 
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